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Tradition(s)II: Hermeneutics, Ethics and the Dispensation of the Good. By Stephen H. Watson.
Indiana University Press, 2001. 301 pages. $35.00.

This book completes the ambitious project begun with Tradition(s): Refiguring
Community and Virtue in Classical German Thought (1997). Its narrow objective is to assess
“the origin and significance of the concept of tradition in recent continental philosophy.”(Preface
to I, xi) But the broader objective is the large and important task of re-appropriating the
humanistic tradition, from Greek classical thought until today, and to articulate “the dispensation
of the Good,” that is, to articulate the basis for a contemporary ethics and politics.
The first volume took up this theme in Kant and German Idealism. This second volume
moves on to consider themes relevant to the concept of tradition in 20th century continental
philosophy, particularly in French post-structuralism and especially in the work of Levinas. The
book, however, is not a chronological history of the concept of tradition in contemporary
European thought. Rather, it is a thematic treatment of the concept of tradition in conjunction
with questions about its relation to law, politics, and community, to ethics and the sublime, to
personhood and friendship, and to the Good and conceptions of humanism. Both books place the
question of tradition quite usefully in the context of the larger history of Western philosophy,
ancient, medieval and modern. Watson pays important attention to 20th century thinkers such as
Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, and Ludwig Wittgenstein—something useful
and yet unusual in work that pays so much attention to contemporary French thought.
From its point of departure with the hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer. there is a
kind of doubleness in the consideration of tradition: first, the account of “tradition” in the
thought of various philosophers who paid the concept important attention, and second, the selfconscious awareness that “the tradition” is at an end or in ruins. The hermeneutics of both

Heidegger and Gadamer understand humans to be historical beings for whom tradition is
importantly constitutive. At the same time, particularly for Heidegger, the theme of “ruin”
(Ruinanz) is important at the early stages of his thought, especially in his phenomenological
interpretation of Aristotle. In fact, as Watson shows us, modernity is itself very much defined by
its hostility to tradition. Its founders sought to put an end to “the” tradition. Kant, who lays the
stage for the developments of German Idealism and 19th century German philosophy, places his
own project, based on “pure reason” amidst “ the ruins of the ancient systems.” (A835/B863)
Furthermore, Kant understands tradition to be an aspect of the “tutelage” which Enlightenment
assists us in putting aside. Watson’s term for this central feature of modern thought is
“detraditionalization.”
It is not clear to this reader where Watson leads us in his discussion of tradition and
detraditionalization in 20th century contintental thought. He tells us that he is leading us into the
breach. He means to show how the question of “traditionality” bears on the basic questions of
ethics and the Good, for, according to Watson following Heidegger and Levinas, the Good
appears out of the breach.(19) This articulation is inevitably, on his account, both fragmentary
and in a state “between”—between nature and history, between freedom and nature, between the
universal and the singular, between the interpretation and the horizon, between the ontic and the
ontological, between past and future. The list could go on. Watson wishes to restore meaning to
humanism, to ethics, and to the idea of the Good. Yet there is a good deal of bafflement and
paradox that goes on in his discussion of these themes. We readers find ourselves having to deal
with remainders, traces, supplements and fragments. Watson plays with a large set of
distinctions and dichotomies. Typically he neither denies the legitimacy of the distinction nor
attempts to overcome the distinction from some larger perspective.
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Watson’s prose is dense and he qualifies too many claims by a “perhaps.”
In addition, the connection of the chapters is not readily apparent. This may be due, in part, to
the fact that several of these chapters had earlier lives. Of his method, Watson, at one point,
says he follows a logic of “juxtaposition.” The thread which leads the reader through the book is
Heideggerian and Gadamerian hermeneutics which Watson confronts somewhat obliquely with
the approaches of Levinas and deconstruction as well as critical theory. The first chapter
discusses community in conjunction with Gadamer’s retrieval of the Arisotelian conception of
friendship. The second chapter, “The Respect for Law,” takes us back to Dante’s humana
civilitas (and an interesting discussion of analogy and allegory) , reminds us via Gadamer that
there is such a thing as the friendship of citizens in Aristotle’s account and that this is a
hermeneutic virtue. The third and fourth chapters raise the questions of otherness and
personhood. The fourth chapter includes a brief account of the history of the concept of the
person. Acknowledging the force of Levinas’ consideration of these issues, Watson importantly
criticizes Levinas on behalf of hermeneutics. And in the fifth and final chapter, “The
Dispensation of the Good,” Watson returns to the opening theme of the place of the Good in the
breach. Here he takes his lead from Wittgenstein and, especially, Heidegger. Acknowledging
various criticisms of Heidegger’s thought in this regard, Watson affirms what he calls Gadamer’s
“posttraditional phronesis” and Heidegger’s ethics of care, for it is the supplement of care that
enables us to retrieve humanism.
The center of the book is the consideration of Levinas. Following Francis Jacques (author of
Difference and Subjectivity), Watson finds Levinas’ self “held hostage in its relation to the
other.” Levinas has lost the Aristotelian notion of reciprocity in friendship.(150) Watson finds
Levinas bound to a subjectivist antinomy and to Kantian obligationism.(196) This, for Watson,
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goes back to Levinas’ commitments to the ‘foundation’ of the separated ego and to abstract
anonymous universality. Watson argues against the view that reciprocity is impossible and
suggests that generosity (philia) can take us beyond the antinomies of egoism and alterity.
Thus, in the end, the thread of Watson’s text leads us to a complicated, qualified,
somewhat vague recovery of humanism that rests on an appreciation of the accomplishments of
Heidegger and Gadamer and their furtherance of the Aristotelian and Stoic traditions. As a
dialectical thinker, Watson is a both/and philosopher. He rejects the either/or. He writes: “In the
end we require both: both the discernments of conscience and convention, civility and law, the
‘saying’ and the said, friendship and justice.”(237) In the same vein, at the conclusion of the
chapter on law, he writes that “incompleteness need not prevent the legitimacy of law and
indeterminacy need not prevent the just rule of law,” adding the qualifier “if both will always
venture and require the supplement of recognition and care.”(122)
I am very much sympathetic with the “both/and” conclusions of Stephen Watson’s book and
with his insights into Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s hermeneutics of empathy (as Watson refers to
it). Yet I wonder if Watson does not bring to his analysis too much the generosity he praises as
essential to friendship and civic virtue. That is, sometimes the differences among the views he
considers are insufficiently attended to. For example, though Watson recognizes differences
between Gadamer and Heidegger, important differences are understated—most importantly with
regard to the concepts of beginning and origin. Though Heidegger has a much richer regard for
and account of human historicality and traditionality than many of the Enlightenment figures that
Watson considers, such as Hobbes, Descartes, and Kant, Heidegger is importantly aligned with
them inasmuch as he sees tradition as blocking our access to our origins and beginnings. Like
Hobbes and much of Enlightenment thought, Heidegger calls for the destruction of the tradition.
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And like the genealogists Nietzsche and Husserl, Heidegger time and again looks to uncover the
origins—of the artwork, for example—or he seeks another beginning. Gadamer thinks it a
mistake to pursue the origin or to look for a new beginning. We always find ourselves in the
middle of things. Watson writes of his account of Heideggerian and Gadamerian hermeneutics:
“Hermeneutics so construed is less the return to origins than it is to the critical venture of their
possibility.(53) I am not sure what this sentence means. If Watson means to carry forward a
Gadamerian hermeneutics with its Aristotelian antecedents by consideration and accommodation
of the critiques of critical theory and deconstruction, I ask how far can one accommodate these
critiques. Similarly I wonder if Watson does not overstate his view of interpretation when he
writes that it is anarchical and ateleological.(57) What does it mean to say that care is a
supplement, while at the same time making it the center of one’s hermeneutical and ethical
position? On the face of it, care is, by definition, teleological. And a hermeneutics of empathy
and care would be similarly teleological.
Robert J. Dostal
Bryn Mawr College
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